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Résumé: Nous prouvons que tout jeu d'arrêt détermininiste à paiements bornés possède
un epsilon-équilibre, et ceci pour tout epsilon.
Abstract: We prove that every two-player non zero-sum deterministic stopping game
with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an epsilon-equilibrium, for every
epsilon>0. The proof uses Ramsey Theorem that states that for every coloring
of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete
infinite subgraph which is monochromatic.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following two-player non zero-sum game, that is played in
stages. At every stage n each of the two players has to decide whether
to quit or to continue the game. If both players decide to continue, the game
proceeds to stage n + 1. Otherwise, the game terminates, and player i re-
ceives the payoff riS,n, where ∅ ⊂ S ⊆ {1, 2} is the set of players that decide
to quit at stage n. If no player ever quits, the payoff is 0 to both players.
This game is a stopping game with deterministic payoff processes. Stop-
ping games have been introduced by Dynkin (1969) as a generalization of op-
timal stopping problems, and later used in several models in economics and
management science, such as optimal equipment replacement, job search,
consumer behavior, research and development (see Mamer (1987) and the
references therein), and the analysis of strategic exit (see Ghemawat and
Nalebuff (1985) or Li (1989)). Dynkin was interested in zero-sum stop-
ping games in which the sequences (rS,n)n are stochastic processes, where
rS,n := r
1
S,n = −r2S,n. He proved the existence of optimal pure strategies,
under the assumption that at any stage, only one of the players is allowed
to stop. Since then, a very extensive literature in the theory of stochastic
processes has dealt with zero-sum stopping games, both in discrete and con-
tinuous time. Most contributions provide conditions on the sequences (rS,n)
under which each player has pure ε-optimal strategies (a pure strategy cor-
responds to the notion of stopping time in probability theory). The typical
condition takes the form: r{1},n ≤ r{1,2},n ≤ r{2},n for each n. Rosenberg,
Solan and Vieille (2001) removed this assumption and proved that every
zero-sum stopping game admits a uniform value, when mixed strategies are
allowed.
Non zero-sum stopping games were studied, amongst others, by Mamer
(1987), Morimoto (1986), Hideo (1987) and Ohtsubo (1987, 1991). They
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provided conditions on the payoff process under which ε-equilibria exist.
We prove that every two-player non zero-sum deterministic stopping game
with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
The proof uses Ramsey Theorem (see, e.g., Bolloba´s (1998)) that states that
for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is
a complete infinite subgraph which is monochromatic. An interesting feature
of the proof is that it does not rely on the proof for zero-sum games.
We are not aware of any previous application of Ramsey Theorem to
game theory, except for Ramsey games, which were designed to fit Ramsey
theory.
2 The Game and the Result
A deterministic (two-player) stopping game Γ is described by a bounded
sequence (rn) in R
6. The components of rn are labeled r
i
S,n, where i = 1, 2
and ∅ 6= S ⊆ {1, 2}. The game is played as follows. At every stage n ≥ 1,
each of the two players has to decide whether to quit or to continue the game.
Let θ be the first stage, possibly infinite, in which at least one of the players
decides to quit, and let S∗ be the subset of players who decide to quit at
stage θ (provided θ < +∞). The payoff to player i is riS∗,θ if θ < +∞, and 0
if θ = +∞.
A (behavioral) strategy for player 1 is a function x : N → [0, 1], x(n) being
the probability player 1 quits at stage n, provided no player quit before that
stage. Strategies y of player 2 are defined analogously.
Every pair of strategies (x, y) induce a payoff to both players:
γi(x, y) = Ex,y[r
i
S∗,θ
1θ<+∞],
where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the probability distribution Px,y over
plays induced by the strategies x and y.
Our main result is:
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Theorem 1 For every ε ∈ (0, 1) the game admits an ε-equilibrium: there is
a pair of strategies (x∗, y∗) such that
γ1(x, y∗) ≤ γ1(x∗, y∗) + ε and γ2(x∗, y) ≤ γ2(x∗, y∗) + ε, for every x and y.
We conclude this section by an example, showing that a 0-equilibrium
needs not exist, even if the sequence of possible payoffs is constant.
Example: Consider the zero-sum game defined by r{1},n = r{2},n = 1
and r{1,2},n = 0 for every n ∈ N. The strategy xε defined by xε(n) = ε
guarantees 1 − ε: infy γ1(xε, y) = 1 − ε. Since payoffs are at most one, the
value of the game is equal to one. However, player 1 has no optimal strategy.
Indeed, let x be any strategy and let y be the strategy defined by
y(n) =


0 if x(n) = 0
1 if x(n) > 0
It is easy to verify that γ1(x, y) < 1.
3 The proof
Since payoffs are uniformly bounded, we assume w.l.o.g. that payoffs are
bounded by 1. Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small once and for all, and choose an
ε-discretization A of the set [−1, 1]2; that is, A is a finite set such that for
every u ∈ [−1, 1]2, there is a ∈ A with ‖a− u‖∞ < ε.
Step 1: Periodic games
For every two positive integers k < l, we define a periodic stopping game
G(k, l) as follows:
riS,n(k, l) = r
i
S,k+(n−1 mod l−k).
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We interpret this game as “the game that starts at stage k, and restarts at
stage l (from stage k)”. We denote by γk,l(x, y) the payoff function in the
game G(k, l).
The game G(k, l) may be analyzed as a stochastic game with finitely
many states. The most convenient way is to define a stochastic game Γ(k, l),
where each stage of play corresponds to a period of play of G(k, l). To be
more formal, the set of action of each player in Γ(k, l) is {c, 1, 2, . . . , l − k}.
Action c corresponds to continuing in all stages of the period. Action labeled
p, 1 ≤ p ≤ l − k, corresponds to continuing in the first p − 1 stages of the
period, and stopping in the pth stage. As is customary for stochastic games,
we represent this game through the following matrix.
c 1 · · · l − k
c 0 r{2},k
∗ r{2},l−1
∗
1 r{1},k
∗ r{1,2},k
∗ r{1},k
∗
...
...
l − k r{1},l−1∗ r{2},k ∗ r{1,2},l−1∗
Figure 1: The game Γ(k, l)
An entry is starred if the corresponding combination of actions leads to an
absorbing state with the corresponding payoff; that is, the game terminates.
Note that stationary strategies in Γ(k, l) correspond to periodic strategies in
G(k, l), with period l− k. A stationary strategy of player i in Γ(k, l) can be
identified with a probability distribution pii over the set {c, 1, ..., l − k} of his
actions, with the interpretation that pii is used in every stage until at least
one of the players chooses an action other than c (and the game terminates).
The game Γ(k, l) is a recursive absorbing stochastic game: there is a
unique non-absorbing state, in which the reward function is identically zero.
By Flesch et al (1996), such games have a stationary ε-equilibrium pi =
(pi1, pi2). Moreover, it follows from their proof that the profile pi can be chosen
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such that one of the alternatives holds:1
A.1 pi1(c) = pi2(c) = 1.
A.2 (i) γik,l(pi) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2,2 and (ii) pi1(c) ≤ 1− ε or pi2(c) ≤ 1− ε.
A.3 (i) γ1k,l(pi) < 0 and pi
2(c) ≤ 1− ε, or (ii) γ2k,l(pi) < 0 and pi1(c) ≤ 1− ε.
In particular, either the probability that both players continue is 1 or it is at
most 1− ε.
We denote by (xk,l, yk,l) the periodic profile in G(k, l) that corresponds
to a stationary ε-equilibrium pi of Γ(k, l) that satisfies one of A.1-A.3. It is
a periodic ε-equilibrium of G(k, l), with period l − k.
For every k < l we choose a(k, l) ∈ A such that
‖γk,l(xk,l, yk,l)− a(k, l)‖∞ < ε.
Step 2: Application of Ramsey Theorem.
For every pair of positive integers k < l we attached an element in the
finite set A – a color. By Ramsey Theorem there is an infinite subset of
integers K ⊆ N and a ∈ A such that a(k, l) = a for every k, l ∈ K, k < l.
In particular, there exists an increasing sequence of positive integers
k1 < k2 < · · · such that for every j ∈ N, a(kj, kj+1) = a. For notational
convenience, we write (x∗j , y
∗
j ) for (xkj ,kj+1 , ykj ,kj+1).
For every k ∈ N, we let G(k,∞) denote the stopping game induced by
Γ from stage k, i.e., riS,n(k,∞) = riS,n+k−1 for every n ∈ N. We denote by
γk,∞(x, y) the payoff function in the game G(k,∞).
Let (x∗, y∗) be the profile in G(k1,∞) obtained by concatenating the
profiles (x∗j , y
∗
j ) :
x∗(n) = x∗j(n+ k1 − kj) for kj − k1 + 1 ≤ n < kj+1 − k1 + 1.
1Alternatively, one can use the analysis of Thuijsman and Vrieze (1989) to show that
there exists a stationary
√
ε-equilibrium that satisfies one of the conditions A.1-A.3.
2With abuse of notations, γik,l(pi) is the payoff of player i in Γ(k, l) under pi.
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The definition of y∗ is similar.
Step 3: |γik1,∞(x∗, y∗)− ai| < ε for i = 1, 2.
Assume w.l.o.g. that k1 = 1. If |ai| ≤ ε, then, for every j, eitherA.1 holds
or Px∗,y∗(kj ≤ θ < kj+1) ≥ ε. In the first case, Px∗,y∗(kj ≤ θ < kj+1) = 0,
whereas in the second,
∣∣Ex∗,y∗
[
riS∗,θ|kj ≤ θ < kj+1
]− ai∣∣ ≤ ε.
By summing up over j ∈ N we get ∣∣γik1,∞(x∗, y∗)− ai
∣∣ ≤ ε.
Assume now that |ai| > ε. Then, for every j, Px∗,y∗(kj ≤ θ < kj+1) ≥
ε and
∣∣Ex∗,y∗
[
riS∗,θ|kj ≤ θ < kj+1
]− ai∣∣ ≤ ε. The first inequality yields
Px∗,y∗(θ < +∞) = 1 while the second implies
∣∣Ex∗,y∗
[
riS∗,θ|θ < +∞
]− ai∣∣ ≤
ε. Therefore,
∣∣γik1,∞(x∗, y∗)− ai
∣∣ ≤ ε.
Step 4: (x∗, y∗) is a 3ε-equilibrium of the game G(k1,∞).
We show that player 1 cannot profit more than 3ε by deviating from x∗.
Assume w.l.o.g. that k1 = 1. Let x be a strategy in G(k1,∞) = Γ
and let xj be the corresponding periodic strategy in G(kj, kj+1): xj(n) =
x(kj+(n−1 mod kj+1−kj)). Since (x∗j , y∗j ) is an ε-equilibrium in G(kj, kj+1),
if Px,y∗(kj ≤ θ < kj+1) > 0 then
Ex,y∗
[
r1S∗,θ|kj ≤ θ < kj+1
]
= γ1kj ,kj+1(xj, y
∗
j ) ≤ γ1kj ,kj+1(x∗j , y∗j ) + ε ≤ a1 + 2ε.
Therefore,
Ex,y∗ [r
1
S∗,θ
1θ<+∞] =
∑
j∈N
Px,y∗(kj ≤ θ < kj+1)Ex,y∗
[
r1S∗,θ|kj ≤ θ < kj+1
]
≤ Px,y∗(θ < +∞)(a1 + 2ε) (1)
• If a1 ≥ −ε, one has a1 + 2ε > 0 hence Ex,y∗ [r1S∗,θ1θ<+∞] ≤ a1 + 2ε.
• If a1 < −ε, then A.3 holds, and one has Px,y∗(θ < kj+1|θ ≥ kj) ≥ ε for
every j. Hence Px,y∗(θ < +∞) = 1, which yields Ex,y∗ [r1S∗,θ1θ<+∞] ≤
a1 + 2ε.
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Therefore,
γ1k1,∞(x, y
∗) ≤ a1 + 2ε ≤ γ1k1,∞(x∗, y∗) + 3ε.
Step 5: Backward induction.
Consider the following k1−1-stage game Γ. In Γ, the two players play the
first k1−1 stages of Γ. If no player quit in the first k1−1 stages, the payoff is
a = (a1, a2). Let (x, y) be an equilibrium in Γ. Thus, x, y : {1, .., k1 − 1} →
[0, 1]. Denote by (x, y) the profile in Γ that coincides with (x, y) up to stage
k1 − 1, and with (x∗, y∗) from stage k1 on. It is straightforward to deduce
from step 4 that (x, y) is a 3ε-equilibrium of Γ. This concludes the proof of
the Theorem.
4 Extensions
We here discuss the extension to n-player games with n > 2, and to games
with general payoff processes.
The proof we presented above is divided into three parts. First we define
for every periodic game a color, by approximating an equilibrium payoff in the
periodic game. Second, we apply Ramsey Theorem to the complete infinite
graph. This way we get a sequence of periodic games. Third, we concatenate
ε-equilibria in these periodic games to form a 3ε-equilibrium in the original
infinite game.
When there are three players, the technique of Solan (1999) can be used to
prove that periodic deterministic stopping games admit equilibrium payoffs.
The ε-equilibria in the corresponding stochastic game Γ(k, l) need not be
stationary: they are either stationary or periodic with period 3. Nevertheless,
one can still construct a 3ε-equilibrium by appropriately concatenating the
ε-equilibrium strategies of the periodic games.
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When there are more than three players, it is not known whether periodic
deterministic stopping games admit equilibrium payoffs.
When the payoff processes are general, the periodic game is defined by its
starting point, and by a stopping time that indicates when it restarts. The
result of Flesch et al (1996) can be applied to show that every such game
admits an equilibrium payoff, and one can generalize Ramsey Theorem to
this more general setup. However, it is not clear whether a concatenation
of ε-equilibria in the periodic games forms a 3ε-equilibrium of the original
game.
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Footnotes:
1. Alternatively, one can use the analysis of Thuijsman and Vrieze (1989)
to show that there exists a stationary
√
ε-equilibrium that satisfies one
of the conditions A.1-A.3.
2. With abuse of notations, γik,l(pi) is the payoff of player i in Γ(k, l) under
pi.
13
